The Impact of the Distributed Ledger Technology on the Financial Industry: Closer Look on the Public Securities' Post-Trade and the Private Equity Market by Lehtovirta, Antti
  
 
The Impact of the Distributed Ledger 
Technology on the Financial Industry	
Closer Look on the Public Securities’ Post-trade 
and the Private Equity Market 
 
 
 
Bachelor’s Thesis 
Antti Lehtovirta 
18.5.2017 
Business Technology 
 
 
Approved in the Department of Information and Service Economy xx.xx.20xx and awarded 
the grade 
 2 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction 3 
1.1 Financial industry’s special needs 3 
1.2 Smart contracts 4 
1.3 Current research and market situation 5 
1.4 Research objectives and methodology 7 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 7 
2. Literature review of the distributed ledger technology 8 
2.1 Distributed nature 8 
2.2 Cryptographic hashing 9 
Figure 2. From transactions to verified blocks. 10 
2.3 Irreversibility by Proof-of-Work or Proof-of-Stake 10 
2.4 Permissioned or Permissionless? 12 
3. Challenges and restrictions of distributed ledger technologies 13 
3.1 Cost of computation 13 
3.2 Scalability 14 
3.3 Legislation and regulation 15 
3.4 Security and privacy 15 
Figure 3. Distributed denial of service. 16 
4. Introduction of use cases from the financial industry 17 
4.1 Clearing and settlement 17 
4.1.1 The current situation and its challenges 17 
Figure 4. Securities’ post-trade market. 18 
4.1.2 Distributed ledger technologies’ possible improvements 19 
4.2 Private equity investing 21 
4.2.1 Use cases from Nasdaq and IBM 22 
4.2.2 Initial coin offering 23 
5. Conclusions 24 
References 26 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Timeline of investments.                                                      6 
Figure 2. From transactions to verified blocks.                   10 
Figure 3. Distributed denial of service.                                 16 
Figure 4. Securities’ post-trade market.                   18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
The distributed ledger technology (DLT), often misleadingly referred to as blockchain, is 
commonly dubbed as the next big thing in the financial industry. Though initially presented 
underneath an alternative cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, to be used without a central bank or any 
other traditional intermediary backing the system (Nakamoto, 2008), the financial industry’s 
so-called traditional players have long since realized the disruptive potential the DLTs possess. 
The original blockchain recording Bitcoin’s transactions and creating the trust in between the 
strangers has shown throughout the years its capability of reliably decentralizing operations. 
However, instead of just concentrating on the different cryptocurrencies and their development, 
the financial services organizations are now researching and investing on how the distributed 
ledger technology could reshape their own businesses (CBInsights, 2017). 
 
The revolutionary feature of the original blockchain is the way it creates trust by computing. 
No technology had been able to transfer value in the internet without a trusted, central 
intermediary before Nakamoto’s suggestion in 2008, as there was no feasible way to be certain 
of an asset’s authenticity. This was solved in Bitcoin by recording the past transactions on a 
public ledger online and allowing every user an access to it, so that the whole community has 
the same view of the past and the current ownings. Furthermore, as the transactions are 
validated by reaching a consensus among the users, the tampering of the ledger is impossible 
in practice. These common technological features of the distributed ledgers are introduced in 
more detail later in this thesis. 
 
1.1 Financial industry’s special needs 
Since 2008 and the credit crisis, the increased regulation and the lack of economic growth have 
resulted in a very inconvenient situation for most of the financial service providers. 
Consequently, the financial industry is expecting a lot from the distributed ledger technologies, 
as they are cited to enhance transparency, save costs and increase security while making the 
whole industry more efficient (IDRBT, 2017; Schneider et al., 2016). Being able to cut off 
manual back office labor, streamline and automate processes, reduce time and even 
simultaneously enhance transparency and increase security are also some of the reasons why 
the DLTs are topping Gartner’s hype cycle for emerging technologies’ peak of inflated 
expectations (Walker et al., 2016). 
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The hype around the original blockchain has buried the reality of it not being directly suitable 
to the financial industry’s problems. As Pinna and Ruttenberg (2016) mention, there are several 
redundant characteristics in it for the financial industry. Firstly, Bitcoin and its technology were 
initially designed to be independent of the financial institutions. The lack of governance and 
regulation in the field of current cryptocurrencies is not suitable for other markets: vice versa, 
being regulated is a necessity for the distributed ledgers to succeed in the financial industry. 
Secondly, blockchain’s absoluteness, meaning the total anonymity of its users, distribution of 
transactions’ information to everybody and the “irreversibility of unlawful transactions” are too 
strict rules to be applied in the financial industry. (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016) These primary 
challenges of DLTs will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis. 
 
1.2 Smart contracts 
The smart contract refers to a programmed, predefined agreement between two entities, which 
is automated to execute itself independently on the distributed ledger (Mattila, 2016). For 
example, the smart contract can be coded to buy a certain amount of shares every day, if the 
price drops below a predetermined level. One can also program the smart contract to continue 
in a never-ending loop, or alternatively self-destruct after a certain time. After the contract has 
been agreed on a ledger, it functions just like any other node on a ledger: its transactions are 
validated by the ledger’s consensus-system, and it’s secured by the cryptographic elements 
(Pinna and Ruttenberg., 2016). 
 
Although originally described in the 1990’s, smart contracts are an essential part of the so-
called “Blockchain 2.0” (Sabo, 1997; Bheemaiah, 2015). At the time of their introduction on a 
white paper, there was no way to exploit smart contracts due to their requirements of high 
computational security and the closeness to the assets being managed by the contract. 
Blockchain 2.0 refers to the phase after the wider usage of Bitcoin introduced people the 
possibilities offered by the distributed ledgers: the original Bitcoin network couldn’t handle 
smart contracts, but the second-generation platforms such as Ethereum were meant to be 
extended with other applications, such as automation and intelligence (Buterin, 2014). 
 
Pinna and Ruttenberg (2016) state that the smart contracts could be the truly value-offering part 
of this hyped technology for the financial service providers. These computational agreements 
possess the ability to genuinely cut costs, increase efficiency and simplify the industry by 
automating most of its now highly manual tasks. Additionally, the risks of fraud and operational 
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mistakes would be diminished, as the smart contracts would act accurately and agreeably even 
without continuous monitoring. (Cant et al., 2016) This thesis will not take a stand on the legal 
problems the smart contracts may face in the near future when further investigated, as that does 
not rule out the high possibility that the combination of distributed ledgers allowing smart 
contracts to automate tasks could still prove to be the real game changer when it comes to the 
financial industry’s needs. 
 
1.3 Current research and market situation 
Despite the potential significance of the distributed ledger technology, the field still lacks major 
scientific articles. According to Elsevier’s Scopus database, the keyword “blockchain” results 
in only 241 documents (3.5.2017). The more current term for all distributed consensus ledgers 
and the one I’m preferring, the distributed ledger technology, doesn’t give even ten results. 
Remarkably, more than three quarters of both of these articles were written in 2016 or later. 
Additionally, as only just over one fifth of these articles concentrates on a finance or business 
related theme, there is a crying need for additional research to be conducted in this field. This 
thesis aims to provide an overview of the financial industry’s needs and potential for the 
purpose of future research. 
 
The lack of research has already been stated by Yli-Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park, and Smolander in 
their article “Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology? – A Systematic Review” 
(2016). Although they took the freedom to exclude all the other papers than those strictly related 
to computer science, which is the most researched part of the field, there were still enormous 
gaps in the literature (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). The findings of the aforementioned study 
correlate strongly with the current problems the whole technology is facing. These challenges 
are also the biggest reasons why DLTs haven’t already been implemented in the financial 
industry. The fundamental, technological challenges are the ones that should be more 
specifically researched. Unfortunately, I’ll not be able to provide anything really new on this 
sector, as it would require a more comprehensive study than a bachelor’s thesis. 
 
The market operators of the financial sector have not been significantly faster in recognizing 
the distributed ledger technologies’ potentiality than the scientific community. Prior to January 
2015, there were just a couple of investments in distributed ledger technologies, provided by 
less known players. Since then, however, the scene has changed a lot. Following the hype of 
Blockchain 2.0 and other than cryptocurrency innovations, every major organization is now 
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included in the competition to be the first one to implement the distributed ledger technology 
into usage. As Figure 1 shows, the latter part of the year 2015 was the period when the financial 
industry truly realized the potential this technology possesses. Furthermore, the investments 
have not been held back, as the chart doesn’t even include the R3 consortium of over 40 
different banks. 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of investments. 
There were just a couple of financial organizations that had invested in DLTs before the later 
part of year 2015. (CBInsights, 2017). 
 
What is truly intriguing is the fact that the organizations depicted in the figure represent all the 
possible corners from the financial industry. Although all these potential markets will not be 
gone through in this thesis, it is worth to remark that the credit card industry, with leading 
brands such as the American Express, Visa and MasterCard, is investing heavily and Visa even 
presenting working solutions for business-to-business payments with a startup called Chain 
(Higgins, 2016). Furthermore, the insurance business is also dubbed as the financial sector to 
be disrupted (Crosby et al., 2016). As we can see from the figure, insurance companies such as 
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MSIG and TransAmerica have taken this emerging technology seriously, and invested 
prominently in it (CBInsights, 2017). 
 
1.4 Research objectives and methodology 
The objective of this research is to provide the reader an overview of the distributed ledger 
technology, its fundamental challenges, the current and potential future uses in the financial 
industry, and to suggest future fields of the topic to be researched. The first task of this thesis 
is trying to answer, “how will the distributed ledger technology impact the financial industry”. 
Although the thesis will not cover exhaustively all the financial industry’s needs towards the 
distributed ledger technology, it will give an overview of the DLTs probable usage in the 
industry. By reading the thesis and especially its use cases from the fields of private equity, and 
settlement and clearing of public securities’ trading, the reader should get a more accurate 
answer to the secondary question “how can the public securities and private equity markets use 
distributed ledger technology in the near future”. 
 
This thesis will mainly be a literature review. Although it would be interesting to research the 
technology itself more precisely and hands on, it isn’t possible with the available resources to 
familiarize with the programmable aspects. However, the current literature, consisting of 
researches, technical white papers and news, offers a sufficient amount of information to 
conduct a thesis of the current distributed ledger technologies. And, as the financial industry 
has lately learnt about the disruptive potential this technology possesses, it has started to publish 
its own studies on this topic too.  
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
The second chapter will describe the four fundamental features that construct the basis for the 
distributed ledger technology. The chapter mostly consists of references to the literature, but 
contains also some reasoning of my own. After this, a reader will be introduced the four widely 
identified challenges the technology must overcome in order to fulfil its potential. The fourth 
chapter aims to provide the reader an overlook of potential uses in the financial industry. 
However, the chapter doesn’t cover the industry’s needs exhaustively, but instead provides the 
reader with a slightly different view in comparison to the current literature. The thesis ends with 
a discussion and conclusions of the true potential the distributed ledger technology could have 
for the financial industry. 
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2. Literature review of the distributed ledger technology 
As mentioned by van Oerle and Iemmens (2016), there are four fundamental features that, when 
put together, create the distributed ledger technologies. First, there is the distributed nature of 
the technology, completely independent of third party intermediaries. Secondly, the 
cryptographic hashing which creates the consensus of which transactions are verified. Thirdly, 
“the irreversibility” of the transaction history, enabled by a proofing process. And finally, the 
choice between permissioned or permissionless ledger, which defines much of the privacy. 
Although these are the major features of technology behind almost every current distributed 
ledger technology, a majority of these concepts were invented for different usages before the 
first blockchain behind Bitcoin. The truly revolutionary aspect of Nakamoto’s white paper was 
the way it introduced these different technologies to be combined (Mattila, 2016).  
 
2.1 Distributed nature 
The first, and possibly the biggest difference the distributed ledger technologies have with other 
value-transferring enabling services is that they are not dependent on one, centralized and 
trusted intermediary (Nakamoto, 2008; Kotilainen, 2017). In fact, the first distributed ledger, 
the blockchain running under Bitcoin, was initially introduced as a service technology enabling 
peer-to-peer –transactions, which would make the trust-creating third parties redundant 
(Nakamoto, 2008). The reason why the distributed nature of the blockchain was and still is 
revolutionizing, is that it eliminates the possible disturbance of the central actor, which would 
affect all the transactions occurring. The single point of failures could be intentional, such as 
corruption or criminal actions, or unintentional, such as global economic shocks. So, although 
the intermediating third parties, for example banks, are designed to be trusted and function 
under stressful events, they are vulnerable, especially to things not related to them, and therefore 
not able to maintain trust in all conditions. 
 
As the intermediaries always have numerous vulnerable features and risks that need to be 
covered by regulation and other intermediaries, such as supervisors, there is certainly room for 
some other possible way to process the transactions. The solution offered by distributed ledger 
technologies is that there is an unlimited amount of copies of the transaction history, distributed 
constantly to all “nodes”, that are the different actors taking part in the ledger, so that everyone 
has access to the same information all the time (Fridlmaier et al., 2016). The reality of having 
 9 
as many copies of past and present transactions as there are nodes limits the possibility of 
history being changed or deleted close to zero, as there is always consensus of the real version 
of the transactions available (Mattila, 2016). It also strengthens the community, be it small and 
local, or big and global, against potential intentional or unintentional disturbance, as the data is 
protected by every node (Fridlmaier et al., 2016). 
 
In the distributed ledger model the acceptance of transactions is very different compared to the 
intermediary-model. While the central party can accept transactions as it likes, the majority of 
the community holding copies of a distributed ledger must reach a consensus if the transaction 
can occur or not (Crosby et al., 2016). However, this is not as difficult as it might seem, as all 
the nodes, which have identical copies of past, are almost simultaneously offered the newest 
proposals to be accepted (Nakamoto, 2008). Therefore, the decision of accepting the transaction 
or not is already done when the transactions is occurring, as the consensus is reached 
simultaneously: every party knows whether the value was owned by the party which eventually 
tries to spend it. But how to be certain that the consensus of past is not being modified 
afterwards? 
 
2.2 Cryptographic hashing 
The distribution of data to all the participants does not itself create trust, but the ownership of 
assets and tracking of it must be secured from tampering. If the past and accepted transactions 
could be deleted or modified, there would be no way to know who truly has the ownership of 
the asset, and the trust has disappeared. So, merely distributing the data is not enough to create 
trust, but the distributed ledger technologies need to use cryptographic ways to ensure that the 
past remains unchanged (Nakamoto, 2008). This is where the hash function and the hash values 
are introduced. 
 
In order to link the past data of ownership to the present transactions, distributed ledgers rely 
on hash functions creating hash values of certain size. A pool of transactions that have occurred 
recently, at roughly the same time, are gathered together, to create a block. The information 
carried by these transactions is then driven through an algorithm that finds the unique hash 
value for that certain source of data (van Oerle and Iemmens, 2016). This hash value is then 
“the time-stamp” of the block of transactions. The following block will again gather certain 
amount of transactions together, but this time also the hash value of the previous block is taken 
into account. This is illustrated in Figure 2: the block’s hash contains also the previous block’s 
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hash.  This is how the blocks create a chain, in which one block has a reference to all the 
previous blocks. (Nakamoto, 2008) 
 
The trust created by this hashing is mathematical. If someone could alter the previous 
transactions, it would change the information included in that certain block, and neither its hash 
nor the following blocks’ hashes would match anymore. (van Oerle and Iemmens, 2016) Hash 
functions create values that can be reached with only certain input: when making even a minor 
change to the input of a hash function, the hash value created is completely different from the 
former hash value. It is also impossible to reach the same hash value with two completely 
different inputs. These aspects make the hashing a valid way to time-stamp transactions. 
(HKMA, 2016) Additionally, hashes do not reveal the information underneath them (Peters and 
Panay, 2015; van Oerle and Iemmens., 2016). By hashing the information, the ledger 
simultaneously decreases the size of the blocks, and also increases privacy while not giving up 
of any security. 
	
 
Figure 2. From transactions to verified blocks. 
Hashing of the block is defined by the information it contains and the previous block’s hash 
(Crosby et al., 2016). 
 
2.3 Irreversibility by Proof-of-Work or Proof-of-Stake 
The hashing process described in the previous chapter is still not trustworthy enough to work. 
What if there were hostile parties trying to get an approval for transactions that would steal 
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assets from other peers? These parties could create blocks of invalid transactions with valid 
hashes at the same time with other peers, and no-one could be certain of the order of the 
transactions, and thus possibly validate double-spending (Crosby et al., 2016). By applying 
proof-of-work, or proof-of-stake, all the parties can be certain that the blocks already in the 
chain, and the ones that are attached to it, are the ones including only accepted transactions 
(Nakamoto, 2008). 
 
In Bitcoin’s solution, the verification system used is proof-of-work. It is also essential if the 
hashing is wanted to work “on a peer-to-peer basis”. (Nakamoto, 2008) The hash function 
described before was made hard to solve, in a way that the hash needed for a new block could 
be reached only by hard, computational work and a bit of luck. If one is willing to add the next 
block to the already-validated chain, the user needs to compete against other users trying to do 
the same. The fastest peer to solve the hash for the selected transactions is rewarded, and the 
block is distributed to all to be validated. Once it is verified that the block includes only legit 
transactions, the block is attached to the longest chain, which includes only blocks having gone 
through similar proof-of-work –process. Then the competition to find the next hash for pending 
transactions will begin again using the previous block’s hash to find it. (Nakamoto, 2008) 
 
The perk of proof-of-work is the safety it creates: it is mathematically impossible that false 
transactions get an approval if the hostile party is not controlling more the 50% of the 
computational power of the ledger community (Peters and Panay, 2015; Lee, 2016). If the 
historical transactions were tampered by a hostile party, the same party has then to change all 
the following blocks’ hashes for the modified history to have matching hashes (Nakamoto, 
2008). All this should be done at the same time when the rest of the parties, and their 
computational power, are solving new hashes for new blocks, and lengthening the chain. To 
get the tampered blocks accepted, the hostile party should control more computational power 
than the rest of the peers together in order to solve hashes faster, and thus create a longer, and 
more proof-of-work –including chain. That is why this kind of an attack is called “the 51% 
attack”: more than half of the computational power is needed to solve mathematical problems 
faster than the rest of the users. (Lee, 2016) 
 
Although the original distributed ledger technologies were using the proof-of-work, the newest 
innovation that the ledgers are now introducing is the proof-of-stake as the technology with 
which the consensus is reached (Gupta, 2017). The proof-of-stake can refer to the stake of 
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computational power, to the stake of assets or some combination of these, or to the 
respectability of the peer in the community (Pilkington, 2016; Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016). 
The permission to create the next block is given to the peer having certain stake of something. 
The perk of proof-of-stake is that although one party would control all the computational power 
and ability to create hashes, it is not worth to start acting maliciously. Validating double-
spending or other hostile actions would only lead to a slump of the value of the assets, as other 
peers could not trust the ledger any more. This leads to the monopoly-validator acting decently 
and only validating acceptable, unbiased transactions. (van Oerle and Iemmens, 2016) 
 
2.4 Permissioned or Permissionless? 
The final characteristic of distributed ledgers is the way users are allowed to act on the chain 
(van Oerle and Iemmens, 2016). Although most of the ledgers to this day have been 
permissionless and public, which truly enable anyone to transfer assets to any other peer on the 
chain, there is a huge demand for permissioned and private ledgers. When it comes to accessing 
the ledger, the division of distributed ledger technologies is the following: there are 
permissioned (or restricted) and permissionless (or unrestricted) ledgers, which can be public 
or private. Permissioned ledgers allow only known parties to access and act on the ledger, while 
permissionless ledgers are open to everyone. Publicness of a ledger refers to the privacy: 
whether outsiders are allowed to see the transaction history or not. (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016; 
Peters and Panayi, 2016) 
 
The most famous permissionless, public ledger is undoubtedly the Bitcoin’s blockchain 
(HKMA, 2016). Anyone who owns a wallet and masters its keys can transfer bitcoins 
(Nakamoto, 2008). The perk of this kind of a ledger is that it is truly peer-to-peer, 
computationally trust-creating way to transfer value in the internet to anyone. This enables new 
kind of markets and transactions, and certainly threatens many “third parties” acting as 
intermediaries, as people could be able to operate peer-to-peer (MacDonald et al., 2016). Most 
of these distributed ledger technologies are seen as disruptive ways to interact, transfer value 
and trust people. Despite their enormous potentiality, the next chapter will go through some 
problems this kind of open ledgers have faced. 
 
The permissioned ledgers may not have the same, disruptive potentialities as the 
permissionless’ ones have, but they do possess market-changing value in numerous cases in the 
financial industry. Actors of these ledgers somewhat know each other in the real life, which, 
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more or less, guarantees that there are no hostile or malicious peers in the community. This 
creates a little trust in the first hand, compared to the starting position of no trust at all in the 
permissionless ledgers. (Peters and Panayi, 2016) The parties on permissioned ledgers do not 
necessarily need to be anonymous, and can have computationally relatively simple way to reach 
consensus, allowing the parties to avoid some of the largest challenges that proof-of-work and 
proof-of-stake bring (Mattila, 2016). This kind of ledgers are the ones that could be 
implemented in between some of the biggest actors in the financial industry, such as banks, 
exchanges and clearing houses. 
 
Even though the blockchain is often referred to or hyped as the technology that changes 
everything, there are numerous, more traditional than peer-to-peer markets in the financial 
industry in which DLTs with permissioned usage would create tremendous value (van Oerle 
and Iemmens, 2016). Chapter 4 of this thesis this thesis will go through some use-cases, both 
permissionless and permissioned, to show that both types do have their ideal niches of 
exploiting. The division is roughly that with public, permissionless ledgers the creators pursue 
for entirely new ways of carrying out trust-requiring transactions, while the permissioned 
ledgers are mainly built to substantially enhance the current way of an organization’s or a 
consortium’s work. 
 
3. Challenges and restrictions of distributed ledger technologies 
The following part of this thesis will describe briefly the four widely referred challenges that 
are characteristic for distributed ledger technologies. Although all of the following troubles 
have been solved in different ways in different ledgers, we are still lacking a technology that 
has a viable solution to all the following issues. There are of course numerous other challenges 
when applying DLTs into practice in the financial industry, but these four are the challenges 
that need to be solved before the distributed ledger technologies can be taken into widespread 
usage. 
 
3.1 Cost of computation 
The cost of computation is an issue even Bitcoin is wrestling with. As described previously, 
proof-of-work is a great innovation when it comes to securing the past data: it only relies on 
computing and mathematics, and does not need a costly third party to validate and guard the 
data. But, the opportunity cost for this is the rising need for computing power, which itself is 
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by no means cheap (Mattila, 2016). The energy consumed annually to keep Bitcoin’s 
blockchain verified is estimated to be in the region of $400 million (Aste, 2016). 
 
To answer the growing cost of computation, there has emerged big “computing pools” to run 
the proof-of-work –process in Bitcoin. Although the cryptocurrency was initially meant to be 
run by individual nodes and computers, private consumers cannot afford to compete against 
these large operators. (Prisco, 2015) The energy consumption and its ineffective cost-structure 
makes the otherwise great technology an inefficient way to compute the transactions in the 
financial industry. Although there are other ways of validating and securing the past data, the 
proof-of-work has emerged as the most reliable way, as proof-of-stake has been found to be 
extremely vulnerable (BitFury Group, 2015). However, for distributed ledgers to reach 
widespread usage, the cost of computing cannot be on this high a level. 
 
3.2 Scalability 
Global financial players, such as Visa, handle from thousands to tens of thousands of 
transactions per second (Croman et al., 2016). When compared to the biggest distributed ledger 
technologies, the numbers in the financial industry are manyfold. For example, Bitcoin’s 
blockchain, and its proof-of-work, can handle only less than ten transactions per second 
(Croman et al., 2016). This difference in between existing distributed ledgers’ and current 
financial markets’ amount of transactions handled is vast. Distributed ledgers are restricted by 
the block’s maximum size and by the interval of forming blocks (IDRBT, 2017). Increasing the 
size of the block or decreasing the time in between forming blocks are effective, but still 
insufficient ways to achieve satisfyingly scaled ledgers for the financial industry’s needs 
(Croman et al., 2016). 
 
Another problem faced by current, permissionless distributed ledgers is the need of spreading 
the data to everyone. Although also a privacy issue, if the users are private consumers, it can 
be demanding to store the whole history of the given ledger. (Peters and Panayi, 2016) This 
may become a huge restriction for public and permissionless ledgers, as the current size of 
Bitcoin’s history has exceeded 100 GB (Blockchain.info, 2017). Although there are suggestions 
of decreasing the space a block’s hash would take up, a more suitable solution would base on 
an algorithm that continuously computes the required degree of distribution to keep the space 
required on a hard drive and the security in balance. 
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3.3 Legislation and regulation 
While originally developed to be able to work without regulation and under no supervision, if 
the distributed ledger technologies are applied to the financial industry they will be facing 
scrutiny and constraints from regulators (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016). In the world of 
constantly increasing and tightening regulations for banking and other financial areas, 
distributed ledgers will not be permitted any exceptions. According to HKMA’s report (2016), 
regulation of DLTs is an area which lacks a lot of actions. Data privacy will be a major issue in 
both permissioned and permissionless ledgers: for what degree is information visible to all 
participants, or are certain users restricted by regulators (IDRBT, 2017)? Who will, or will 
anyone, oversee completely decentralized, permissionless ledgers? What if the past transactions 
need to be altered: is that permitted, and how is the consensus of this reached in permissionless 
ledgers? These are only some of the questions the DLTs will face before a global usage, that 
are not going to be answered in this thesis but only mentioned just to highlight the current lack 
of distributed ledger technologies’ legislation and regulation. The critical questions of who is 
going to regulate, what actions are going to be regulated and how will they be regulated are still 
not answered anywhere (HKMA, 2016). 
 
3.4 Security and privacy 
With every new technology, there comes new threats of security breaches. This is not different 
with distributed ledger technologies, which rely on strong cryptography and a lot of potentially 
globally distributed computing power. Depending on whether the ledger is permissioned or 
permissionless, there are different major challenges for security of the ledger. Also, the privacy 
of ledgers is an issue to keep an eye on: how to simultaneously keep the personal information 
secured and private, but not to give money launderers and other hostile parties a possibility to 
evade regulation? 
 
Some of the potential security threats have already been mentioned in this thesis. For the 
permissionless ledgers, the threat of the 51% attack is significant, as there may exist a couple 
of major computing pools. If they were to turn out to be hostile and work together, the rest of 
the actors on the ledger could do nothing for the majority accepting their own transactions. 
(Lee, 2016) A permissionless ledger could also be slowed down by a distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) type of an attack, which aims to make the nodes overloaded and thus prevent 
the ledger from recording transactions at its usual pace (HKMA, 2016). Figure 3 further 
illustrates such an attack.	
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Figure 3. Distributed denial of service. 
Illustration of the distributed denial of service attack on a single validating node, which 
prevents the nodes 5 and 6 to contact the rest of the nodes (HKMA, 2016). 
 
When it comes to permissioned ledgers, the challenges are mainly technological. The threat of 
a DDoS attack is always possible, which could also lead to infecting all the ledgers’ computers 
and thus slow down the whole system. The importance of securing systems and computers on 
a permitted ledger is something that should be handled even before new nodes are added. 
(HKMA, 2016) It should also be noted that the permissioned, private ledgers’ information are 
visible only to those nodes that need to see them. Even though we are talking about different 
banks or other trusted parties in the current financial industry, it would not be necessary to 
distribute every bit of information to everyone. (BIS, 2017) 
 
Privacy issues are extremely difficult on permissionless ledgers, as they need balancing the 
nodes’ privacy and the regulator’s demand to have transparency on transactions. Permissioned 
ledgers are obviously a better solution to this problem, as they might have a regulator-node 
checking the required information. (HKMA, 2016) And, although in both ledger types the nodes 
would like the transaction data to be visible only to those transacting, the regulator will always 
need an access to monitor the market. In permissioned ledgers, there can be nodes with varying 
roles, which would authorize also the regulator to perform individually. (IDRBT, 2017) 
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However, this is a major threat for the permissionless ledgers in financial industry, as the current 
technology does not offer any solution for this problem. 
 
4. Introduction of use cases from the financial industry 
The following part will go through potential and already established use cases of distributed 
ledger technologies from the financial industry. Although for example global trade financing 
and cross-border business-to-business and peer-to-peer payments are dubbed to be the fields 
that will certainly benefit from the consensus ledger technologies (World Economic Forum, 
2016; McKinsey&Company, 2017; Tapscott and Tapscott, 2017), they will not be further 
introduced in this thesis. The reason is that these two areas, together with another huge field 
insurance business, have already attracted so much attention and coverage in the literature and 
media that it is not necessary to go through them in here again more specifically. The areas 
chosen for this thesis represent very different markets: the first one would benefit a lot from 
permissioned, private ledgers, which would decrease costs tremendously. The second one, 
however, is a more fragmented market: it could be even disrupted and not just enhanced by 
applying a fitting distributed ledger model. More significantly, there is even an opportunity to 
create a completely new, permissionless peer-to-peer market. 
 
4.1 Clearing and settlement 
Clearing and settlement refers to the publicly traded securities post-trade process. Although the 
initial transaction may occur almost simultaneously for the individual investor, it takes 
tremendous amount of work from multiple intermediaries to eventually trade the security and 
the payment securely to the different sides of the deal. 
 
4.1.1 The current situation and its challenges 
The current publicly traded securities’ post-trade clearing and settlement market is a 
complicated world. As depicted in Figure 4, it consists of global and regional actors, including 
custodian banks, investors, brokers, central securities’ depositories, central clearing 
counterparties and exchanges (World Economic Forum, 2016; Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016). 
The whole process from the actual trade to its settlement takes usually from two to three days 
with ordinary securities, such as stocks or bonds, and with more complicated ones, such as 
credit default swaps or leveraged loans, even a couple of weeks (Investopedia, 2017a; Robinson 
and Leising, 2015). Although the investor is usually unaware of his or her trade not completed, 
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the interim period represents a risk of the security not registered correctly. There is a little the 
investor can do to this risk but hope it does not materialize. 
 
  
Figure 4. Securities’ post-trade market. 
Publicly traded securities’ post-trade process requires several organizations working 
seamlessly together. (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016). 
 
Although trading and matching sellers and buyers is highly automatized, the clearing and 
settlement processes require exceptional amounts of manual work from intermediaries’ back-
offices. During high demand for trading, it is possible that one, central partner is overloaded 
with transaction clearing requirements (Van de Velde et al., 2016). This leads to a counterparty 
risk mentioned in World Economic Forum’s (2016) report: the settlement may not occur, which 
may even lead to a trade not occurring. This is a risk for banks and their back-offices, as they 
are required to wait for the confirmation of the traded asset’s settlement until it can be finally 
registered for an investor. 
 
Even if the central securities’ depository is not overly tasked and is able to begin the clearing 
process of the transaction by matching the buyer and seller sides’ trade details, there is a risk 
of inconsistent data (World Economic Forum, 2016). Being in connection with all the custodian 
banks who should be providing the transaction details, the possibility of some party giving false 
details of the trade to the central securities’ depository is considerable. The current process is 
thus highly manual, and therefore risky. The trading details include the timing of the trade, cash 
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involved in the trade and bank details of the trade’s counterparties. According to World 
Economic Forum (2016), especially “frequent changes to counterparty bank details” is a 
weakness in the current clearing and settlement environment. 
 
The entity carrying the credit risk of a transaction’s different counterparties during the settling 
is the central clearing counterparty. These organizations lie in between the custodian banks of 
the buyer and the seller, acting as a party which simultaneously transfers equity and cash to 
opposite banks. However, there is an operational risk of technological and manual errors when 
executing these swaps. To increase efficiency, central clearing counterparties usually try to 
involve all the similar trades into a one “net transaction” to keep the amount of transactions 
lower, which also further decreases the risk of error occurring. (World Economic Forum, 2016) 
This still does not remove the risk of the central clearing counterparty failing to materialize the 
trade through a manual error. 
 
4.1.2 Distributed ledger technologies’ possible improvements 
Clearing and settlement of securities is one of the biggest areas in which the distributed ledger 
technologies are expected to prove to be disruptive. The possibility of all the different 
counterparties reaching simultaneously consensus on a certain transaction, the reduction of 
manual work through smart contracts, and dividing the risk and pressure away from single, 
central counterparty reduce risk tremendously (Mills et al., 2016). This leads to decreased time 
and even real-time settling, and also makes matching and detail-sending back and forth done in 
the back-offices redundant (Van de Velde et al., 2016). According to Accenture’s report (2017), 
exploiting distributed ledger technologies into clearing and settlement could lead to even 50% 
reduction of expenses. However, whether the DLTs will be used only within some single party 
or across the whole post-trade industry defines significantly the industry’s cost-reductions. 
 
The interim period in between the trade’s actual time of occurring and the finishing of its 
settling can be decreased. The potential of near real-time settling is there: it is possible to 
manage the security side of the transaction using distributed ledger technology. The current 
restriction of real-time settling is the cash side of trade and its settling using distributed ledger 
technology, as it would require national currencies traded in digitalized form. (Pinna and 
Ruttenberg, 2016) Currently, the simultaneous exchange of the security and cash is reached by 
TARGET2-Securities in Europe, which is a central-bank backed system providing funds for 
trades to be settled as they happen (ECB, 2016) To bypass the current system, traditional 
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currencies should be tradeable in distributed ledgers. Luckily for the progress there are 
numerous central banks all over the world researching how they can take advantage of this 
emerging technology (Wild, 2016). One of the most progressive nations in this field has been 
Poland, which already has its own, zloty-backed cryptocurrency (van Oerle and Iemmens, 
2016). 
 
The counterparty risk described in the previous section is something more challenging for the 
distributed ledgers. Current, blockchain-like DLTs are not especially efficient when there is a 
huge amount of transactions occurring (IDRBT, 2017). However, smart contracts enabled by 
the exploitation of distributed ledgers is a partial solution so the above-mentioned risk. The 
possibility to fully automatize the validation of a transaction can be achieved by strict 
conditions, and thus reducing the risk the custodian banks face when waiting for central 
securities depository to validate the transaction (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016). The original 
formation of Bitcoin’s blockchain may not be efficient enough for wider exploitation and there 
are numerous projects and startups trying to defeat the scalability problems. 
 
The simultaneous distribution of data through DLTs provides a solution for the risk of invalid 
data. (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016) When the requirements for the data are standardized, 
custodian banks can share their part of the transaction details easily to the other counterparties. 
Moreover, the ledger keeps all the parties updated, which further decreases the risk of data 
being erroneous. (Pinna and Ruttenberg, 2016) The increased transparency eases also the 
regulator’s job, as it would be easier to monitor numerous assets and their details’ correctness 
at a glance (van Oerle and Iemmens, 2016). As some manual work cannot be reduced just by 
exploiting distributed ledgers, there is of course a need for someone in the back-office to enter 
the details in the first place.  
 
The central clearing counterparties’ business model and the whole settling process is threatened 
by smart contracts of the ledger. To minimize the operational risk during this section, the 
settlement could be done by letting the smart contracts act programmed, and thus independently 
take care of trading the cash side to seller and the security to the buyer. The more the financial 
markets could lean on to smart contracts, the less there would be operational risks of manual 
errors. (World Economic Forum, 2016) There is also a possibility that the central clearing 
counterparties’ roles in common securities settling vanishes completely. This would require a 
very transparent ledger, in which the counterparties are aware of the others’ possessions, and 
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therefore can settle instantly. (Van de Velde et al., 2016) However, whether the risk-decreasing 
benefits of “net transactions” during the settlement can be achieved without the clearing 
counterparties remains to be seen, as there is no consensus of this (World Economic Forum, 
2016; Van de Velde et al., 2016). 
 
To conclude, there still remains many aspects to be improved in order to the distributed ledgers 
become suitable to be used in clearing and settlement of trading. The current technology cannot 
process the vast amount of trades occurring in the securities markets throughout the world. 
Additionally, the lack of a trusted, central bank backed cryptocurrency which could be used in 
the cash leg of trading is also a big obstacle for the distributed ledgers to become globally 
exploited. However, as already mentioned, there is a growing need for clearing and settlement 
to match the more technologically progressive trading market’s efficiency (IDRBT, 2017). And 
as more and more central banks are researching the field of fiat cryptocurrency, the securities’ 
post-trade market is certainly willing to exploit distributed ledger technologies in the near 
future. 
 
4.2 Private equity investing 
Private equity investing refers to capital investments made directly to non-listed companies in 
an exchange for a stake of the firm (Investopedia, 2017b). It differs quite substantially from the 
public trading of securities which was introduced earlier. Typically, the market consists of small 
businesses seeking for a rapid growth, and institutional investors, such as venture capital firms, 
angle investors and pension funds (BVCA, 2010). The value of this market is enormous: in year 
2016, the amount of managed assets came close to exceeding $2,5 trillion (Preqin, 2017). 
Nowadays, private equity companies are increasingly interested in investing to the distributed 
ledger technology too: venture capital investments in the technology were almost $500 million 
in 2016, and the cumulative investments over the years have exceeded $1,5 billion (CoinDesk, 
2017). 
 
Despite the size of the market, there are only a few parties which can operate there. To start 
with the investor side, an individual consumer is not able to take part in almost any private 
equity deal as the typical minimum deal size is north of $250.000 (Lambert, 2017). Only initial 
public offerings, IPOs, are partially open for the individual investors. The situation is equally 
challenging for small businesses not looking to grow aggressively: the private equity investors 
are typically looking for higher returns than they would be getting from the public equity trading 
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(BVCA, 2010). This leaves most of the small businesses depend on debt-financing, which has 
its own risks. 
 
The private equity market is not that attractive for the private equity companies either. A huge 
risk is that the initial investment never even sees any profit, as the only viable ways to get return 
are through an IPO, merger or acquisition, or sale of the company (Lamarque, 2016). The lack 
of liquidation possibilities is down to the fact that there are not any marketplaces for these 
equity stakes of a growing company. The risk for the investor has also increased by time, as 
companies prefer to stay private longer than before (TrueBridge Capital, 2015) Additionally, 
private equity markets are lacking information. An investor is not able to gather data of the 
investment, as these companies are usually not required to release their financial information. 
(Berger and Udell, 1998) The transparency issue is still relevant even though some data may 
be available through researches (Berger and Udell, 1998; Lamarque, 2016) 
 
Lastly, the initial public offering, which is the final private equity issuance before a company’s 
shares start to trade publically, is quite an expensive way to acquire capital (Lamarque, 2016). 
The IPO cost for the company is usually in the region of 5% of its post-IPO valuation (Ritter, 
2014). There are numerous phases which increase the cost before the stock can be issued. The 
whole process includes several intermediaries, including investment banks, management 
consultants and lawyers, who all are taking their stakes and therefore causing “friction costs” 
(Lamarque, 2016). Although the post-IPO trading of the stocks is quite efficiently executed in 
exchanges as mentioned earlier, the IPO process itself requires significant amount of 
development. 
 
4.2.1 Use cases from Nasdaq and IBM 
As the problems described above are widely acknowledged, there have already emerged some 
potential, though still quite simple solutions. Both services this thesis covers are trying to solve 
the illiquidity problem the private equity has, but to also enhance the market’s lack of 
information. What is important with these use cases is that the regulators could get to monitor 
and investigate them much better than some theory says (Shin, 2017; IBM, 2017). Although 
these two would not be the eventual services for the private equity market, at least they are 
valuable in a pioneering way. 
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In December 2015, Nasdaq and a startup called Chain announced their common project called 
Linq (Nasdaq, 2015). Linq was the first distributed ledger –backed private equity platform for 
growth companies seeking to keep track of their equity shareholders transparently. The 
permissioned ledger instantly attracted six startups to issue their equity there. Since the platform 
is still just in the testing phase, it does not allow peer-to-peer transactions. However, the 
platform still simplifies the process of issuing shares privately, and also tracks information of 
the company’s current valuation and owner base. (Rizzo, 2015) Remarkably, Linq can execute 
the whole issuance of private shares, from trades to the settlement and clearing of them. It 
enables businesses a much lower, and more transparent way of acquiring private equity. 
 
The second use case this thesis is introducing is developed by IBM and Northern Trust, 
emphasizing the private equity fund’s management. Trading the limited partners’ stakes should 
be substantially more efficient than nowadays, as the current process is heavily reliant on 
manual work. (IBM, 2017; Irrera, 2017) The ledger eases the management by providing the 
trust that is currently created by tens of fund managers and lawyers. This not only decreases 
time and work spent tremendously, but simultaneously releases more funds to be invested. And, 
as the private equity is not traded in the same volumes as the publicly listed securities, current 
distributed ledger technology solutions are able to manage the task. (Del Castillo, 2017) IBM 
and Northern Trust’s distributed ledger solves partially the illiquidity and transparency 
problems the private equity investors face. Next, this thesis will introduce potentially an even 
more disruptive way to execute private equity trading. 
 
4.2.2 Initial coin offering 
Initial coin offering, ICO, is a crypto-equity issuance, in which the company issues “tokens” 
that represent a piece of the company’s equity, much like shares are issued in IPOs. The token 
is priced by the company to represent its current value, and then sold on a marketplace built on 
a distributed ledger platform such as Ethereum. (Kastelein, 2017) To call the token a stake of 
the company or equity is probably misleading: the whole initial coin offering business is legally 
completely on a grey area of the financial industry (Lundy et al., n.d.). The idea is still highly 
similar to the equity crowdfunding, executed just completely without intermediaries and using 
cryptocurrencies (Kastelein, 2017).  
 
What makes initial coin offerings intriguing is not the size of its market: it represents just less 
than 1% of the whole crowdfunding market (Lundy et al., n.d.). However, the interesting thing 
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is the size of these ICOs: some of the latest ones are comparable in size to “Series B financing 
round” (Laurent, 2017). This has alerted some more traditional private equity market actors, 
such as venture capital funds, to invest in them. As the traditionally high-profit-earning funds 
are facing decreasing returns, ICO tokens’ valuations were gaining even hundreds of 
percentages during 2016. Additionally, these tokens offer the venture capitalists great liquidity 
compared to the traditional private equity investments, as the tokens could be traded back to 
fiat backed currency. (Kastelein, 2017) One venture capital fund has even acquired capital to 
its newest fund by issuing a token, which provides the investor a piece of the funds profits 
(Laurent, 2017). 
 
Although the ICO market is quite tiny compared to any other private equity market, and the 
tokens are under increasing scrutiny from regulators, the initial coin offering could prove to be 
an answer to the illiquidity problem in private equity markets (Lundy et al., n.d.). At least the 
model should be increasingly researched, as it could provide relatively cheap financing just 
from the traditional investors, but also from the individual investors for the early-stage 
companies (Tapscott and Tapscott, 2017). Initial coin offerings could also be linked to a 
distributed ledger backed exchange, where the tokens could be traded in a regulated 
environment, just like IPO-issued shares are traded in an exchange. Although it is not even 
certain whether the ICOs are here to stay, their functionalities should be considered when 
further designing and developing future distributed ledger applications for the financial 
industry. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This thesis has introduced the distributed ledger technology and the hype around its impact on 
the financial industry to the reader. The second chapter familiarized the reader with the four 
fundamental features which have so far been the corner stones for every ledger. These 
technological bricks are the distributed nature, cryptographic hashing, proofing process and the 
question about the ledger’s openness to the users (van Oerle and Iemmens, 2016). Although 
each feature has its challenges which need to be defeated, distributed ledgers are already in 
quite wide usage in the form of Bitcoin and Ethereum. 
 
However, this thesis was not just aimed to explain the distributed ledger’s functioning. This 
thesis was written in order to find an answer to the two questions defined in the introduction. 
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The first task, and simultaneously the primary one, was to question the impact the distributed 
ledger technologies will have on the financial industry. Additionally, the secondary question 
was targeted to find out about the concrete changes the DLTs will have on both the public 
securities’ post-trade market, and the private equity market. And, as the fourth chapter pointed 
out, both markets will face significant changes during the upcoming years: public securities’ 
post-trade processes will benefit from the more secure and rapid settlement, whereas the private 
equity market’s whole nature can become a more accessible for both the investors and the 
businesses seeking for financing. 
 
The question about the distributed ledger technology’s impact on the whole market is 
complicated. Although the easy answer would be to either live by the hype surrounding the 
conversation and suggest the DLTs will change everything, or on the contrary not to believe in 
its disruptive potential and to suggest the whole technology is just a passing fad in the age of 
fintech, it is hard to ignore two facts. The first fact is the ever-increasing amount of financing 
to the distributed ledger technology and to the teams researching its suitability to almost every 
current and future financial industry’s problem (CBInsights, 2017; CoinDesk, 2017). Although 
initially the industry did not react to DLTs’ potentiality, it has now turned its approach round. 
Every major player has now its own project, or is co-operating with other organizations to find 
a way to disrupt the current state of the financial industry with the DLTs. 
 
However, the second fact is that there are no low-hanging fruits in the financial industry when 
it comes to the DLT. Although Bitcoin and Ethereum are quite widely recognized, their impact 
on the financial industry is very limited. The innovations potentially disrupting the current 
market are not easily reachable: there are significant restrictions for example in the technology’s 
scalability, and regulation (IDRBT, 2017). There are no easy solutions which could completely 
change the nature of the current business when implemented, otherwise this thesis would have 
pointed them out.  
 
The greatest impact the distributive ledger technologies will have on the financial industry is 
that they will make the industry’s operations much more effective and secure. Although the 
current third-parties will not probably cease to exist, the DLTs will significantly reduce the 
manual work needed in the back-offices all over the different markets. The literature, and the 
majority of the market operators, seem to believe that the financial industry could adopt the 
DLTs into different global usages during the next five years. Additionally, it is expectable that 
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during the same time frame, individual consumers will be offered practical, possibly disruptive 
ledger technologies with which they can manage their personal, both day-to-day and long-term-
investment, financial issues without a traditional intermediary. As Bitcoin and Ethereum have 
shown us, the technology can be adopted in every-day life. The financial industry will almost 
certainly face competition from outside its traditional players. 
 
As a suggestion for future research, the distributed ledger technology offers possibilities almost 
endlessly. Ignoring now all the other industries, the financial industry suffers widely from the 
lack of trust. The reason for this being whatever it is, the situation offers an opportunity for the 
future research to find out suitable computationally trustful solutions basing on the DLT. As 
Yli-Huumo et al. (2016) found out in their study, the lack of technical research in this field is 
immense. Therefore, the demand for more technical studies in the financial industry is clearly 
substantial. Hopefully this thesis can serve as an inspiring first step for the future research to 
further study and develop DLT –based solutions for the financial industry. 
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